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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA ANN-MELVILLE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

9882

SAMUEL G. MEL VILLE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is action by plaintiff against defendant for divorce, child custody, child support, alimony, attorney's
fees, and distribution of property, wherein defendant
filed a counterclaim for divorce and property settlement.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment
awarding plaintiff a divorce, $50 per month child support
money, $50 per month alimony, awarding plaintiff the
automobile, furniture and household furnishings of the
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parties (except one 36-piece crystal set and one record
cabinet), $400 attorney's fees, costs, $597.75 arrears in
alimony and child support, and ordering defendant to
pay $65 to the University of Utah and $14.49 to the Utah
Power and Light Company, and dismissing defendant's
counterclaim, defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have said judgment reversed
and asks for judgment on his counterclaim awarding defendant a divorce, awarding plaintiff custody of the child
of the parties, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in
defendant, awarding plaintiff $50 per month child support money, awarding plaintiff no alimony or attorney's
fees, ordering defendant to pay $65 to the University of
Utah and $14.49 to the Utah Power and Light Company, awarding plaintiff judgment for $597.75 arrears
under order pendente lite, and awarding plaintiff the
following property, to-wit: one fruitwood cabinet, one
pine secretarial, one love seat, one bedroom set, one crystal chandelier, 4 rosewood chairs, one 36-piece set crystal ware, and one-half interest in said automobile.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
\ In making this statement of facts the numbers in
parenthesis refer to the pertinent page numbers of the
record·
Plaintiff and defendant each sought a divorce on the
grounds of cruelty causing great mental distress ( 1, 6).
In addition, plaintiff originally sought $100 per year ali-
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mony, $400 attorney fees, the Mercedes automobile, and
all of the furniture and household effects of the parties
( 2). Later plaintiff amended her complaint to ask for $50
per month alimony ( 13). Plaintiff testified that she did
this because she needed it because of expenses of the child
and partly because the case dragged on a bit ( 63) .
In addition to the divorce, defendant sought a onehalf interest in said automobile ( 6), and certain items of
furniture, to-wit: one fruitwood record cabinet, one pine
secretarial, one love seat, one bedroom set, one crystal
chandelier, four rosewood chairs, and one 36-piece set of
crystal ware ( 6) .
The trial court awarded plaintiff the divorce on the
grounds of mental cruelty, awarded plaintiff custody of
said child, subject to reasonable rights of visitation, $50
per month child support, $50 per month permanent alimony, all of the 1956 Mercedes automobile, all of the
furniture and household furnishings of the parties except
for said 36-piece crystal set and a record cabinet which
were awarded to defendant, $400 attorney fees and costs,
a judgment for $597.75 arrears on order pendente lite
and ordered defendant to pay bills in the sum of $79.49
(23, 24).
Plaintiff and defendant were each bona fide and
actual residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, for more than
three months immediately prior to the commencement of
this action ( 33, 86).
Plaintiff and defendant were married to each other
on August 18, 1960, at Salt Lake City, Utah (34); plaintiff and defendant were married to each other less than
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one year and nine months at the time this· action was
commenced· ( 2) . After the commencement of this action
one ·child was born as issue of said· marriage, to-wit:
Michael David ( 34, 65). PI'aintiff was a school teacher at the time of marriage ( 62), and during the mar~
riage comph~ted the requirements for becoming a librarian ( 62) and was employed as a librarian at the time of
the trial ( 61 ) . That defendant. was unemployed and· not
attending college at the time of said marriage ( 34) ~ That
defendant resumed his schooling at the University ofUtah
one month after 'said marriage ( 35)-' That defendant attended the University for five quarters continuing through
the Winter Quarter of 1962 ( 36). At the time of trial
defendant required about two semesters to complete his
college work ( 103) . That during the marriage, defendant
worked at a number of part time and summer jobs, towit: Salt Lake County Hospital, Western Trading, Lithograph Co., Nevada Lodge, Cal-Nev Lodge, Clark Lehming, University of Utah, and Menlove, Inc. At these jobs,
defendant earned approximately $1846 ( 107 to 109).
Plaintiff's gross salary as a librarian is $4200 to $'4298
per year ( 62) . Plaintiff's beginning salary as school teacher was $3600 per year ( 62). Plaintiff's take home pay is
$288 per month (56). At the time of the trial. defendant
was living in Los Angeles,· California ( 86), and was employed by Barker Brothers, Pasadeha, California, as a furniture salesman and decorator (99). His take home pay
was $250 per month ( 100). Plaintiff testified. (52 to 55)
that her expenses for herself and the child of the parties
per month are :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
CHILD
PLAINTIFF
$ 55.00 · Child care · $ 80.00 Rent·
10.00 Doctot bill
2.50 Telephone bill
5~00 · Medicine
4.00 Light bill
10.00 · Credit Union
20.00 Food
2·50 Vitamins
5.. 00 . Laundry
·10.00 Clothing
5.00 Dry cleaning
·s.oo Doctor bill
5.00 Laundry
·25.00· Food
$107.50
25.00 Gasoline for automobile
30.00 Clothing and cosmetics, etc·
' 5.00 Car insurance
· 6.00 Automobile taxes
30.00 Miscellaneous, including entertainment
$232.50
Plaintiff testified that she felt that $75 is a reasonable
amount for child support and that $50 a month is reasonable for alimony (56) .
Defendant testified ( 101 to 103, 122) that his
monthly expenses ar~:

$ 60.00
10.00
80.00
4.10
3.00
30.00
15.00

DEFENDANT
· Rent
Bus travel
Food and Kitchen equipment
Laundry
Dry cleaning
Clothing
Medical

$202·10
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Defendant also testified that he had a severe sinus condition and that he required a tonsillectomy and surgery
on his nose ( 103) . Defendant also testified that he planned to complete his schooling in California at UCLA and
that he had no savings for his tuition ( 103).
The following list sets forth the property belonging
to the parties together with its value and source ( 104 to
106, 47 to 49, 30 to 32, 53 and 133):
PROPERTY
36-piece crystal set

VALUE
$ 36.00

Bedroom set
Boston rocker
Table lamp
Kitchen table
Two kitchen chairs
Pottery set
China set
Refrigerator
Room .divider
Love seat
Two wing back chairs

600.00
25.00
15.00
15.00
10.00
60.00
60.00
50.00
15.00
75.00
60.00

Inlaid table
Oriental rugs
Marble topped table
Silver lamp
Upholstered chair
Stereo set

60.00
800.00
60.00
40.00
40.00
80.00

Cabinet
Pine secretarial
Kitchen utensils, etc.
Carpets and misc. wed
ding gifts
Crystal chandelier

20.00
60.00
100.00

Four rosewood chairs
Mercedes automobile
Total

-

100.00
50.00
100.00
600.00

SOURCE
Purchased by parties and paid
for by defendant's parents
Gift from defendant's parents
Purchased by parties
Gift from defendant's sister
Gift from plaintiff's parents
Purchased by the parties
Gift from various people
Gift from various people
Purchased by the parties
Made by .defendant
Obtained by defendant
Acquired by plaintiff prior
to marriage
Gift from plaintiff's parents
Gift from plaintiffs parents
Purchased by parties
Purchased by parties
Gift from plaintiffs' parents
Acquired by plaintiff before
marriage
Gift from defendant's parents
Gift from defendant's parents
Wedding gifts
Defendant traded a painting
therefor
Purc~ased by parties
Acqmred by both parties

$3131.00
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At the time of trial plaintiff was 26 years old ( 33).
At the trial, plaintiff's attorney asked her, "Now, Mrs.
Melville, you have alleged that on or about the 29th day
of April, 1962, and prior and subsequent thereto, that
the defendant has treated you cruelly, causing you great
mental distress?" To which plaintiff answered, "Yes."
She was then asked, "What are the circumstances that
brought about this charge?" ( 34). Thereafter, plaintiff
testified to some difficulties between the parties during
the first month of marriage because she came home from
work tired, had to prepare dinner, look beautiful, and
be ready to go out while defendant was at home all day
or with his friends, he no~ having started school until it
started one month later ( 35) ; that the parties did not
live in happiness and peace during the first year of their
marriage because defendant was not pursuing the things
he had allegedly told plaintiff he was going to pursue,
and because defendant started to smoke several months
after m(lrriage which bothered plaintiff very much
( 36, 37) . Plaintiff testified that she smoked once during
the marriage and on that occasion told defendant to smoke
in the home ( 37). Plaintiff later testified that she had
smoked several times before in college days ( 61). Plaintiff further testified that defendant commenced to drink
alcoholic beverages and that this bothered plaintiff very
much ( 37). Plaintiff testified that she drank once during
the marriage ( 37), and that she did some drinking in college days ( 60, 61). Plaintiff testified that she seldom
accompanied defendant evenings (37), that within the
few months before plaintiff filed for divorce, that defendant was out of the house at least four nights a week
during a period while defendant was not in school but
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was working as an interior decorator ( 38) where defendant worked perhaps five hours a day ( 39). This was
during a time when the parties were having considerable
difficulty together ( 63), and at a time when plaintiff did
not enjoy being with defendant ( 63, 64) · Defendant testified that on these occasions he was working at the Art
Department ( 129). Plaintiff testified that defendant did
not provide much money for family use ( 39, 40), that defendant sought the association of other women in that
many times while plaintiff was with defendant he was
"directly friendly with some party" and would leave plaintiff and take up conversation with other women and that
plaintiff thought defendant had an unusual interest in
other women and that defendant talked. to plaintiff of
other girls, making remarks as to their beauty ( 40, 41 ) .
Plaintiff was asked, "Did you hear sufficient about
your husband's activities that it might be construed as a
reputation that he had?" Plaintiff answered "Yes." Defendant objected to this as being immaterial and improper; the court overruled the objection ( 41 ) . Plaintiff
was then allowed to testify over defendant's objection on
the same ground that she knew that reputation and that
the reputation was that defendant was "very flirtatious"
(41, 42). Plaintiff was then asked, "Did your finding out
about this reputationthat you have testified of, cause you
mental concern?" To which plaintiff answered, "Yes, it
did, very much," and when asked, "Did it cause you
anguish?" plaintiff answered, "Yes, it did." When asked,
"Did it cause you to be embarrassed among your friends
who also knew. of this reputation?" plaintiff answered,
"Yes, it did" ( 42).
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Plaintiff further testified that about May 4th or 5th,
1962, on an occasion when defendant had been drinking
very heavily, plaintiff attempted to distuss their situation
but defendant would not discuss the matter with plaintiff
( 43, 44) . Plaintiff also testified that on an occasion in
1962 defendant refused to stay home from a guitar session when asked to do so by plaintiff, and that defendant
had told her that she was to ask him no questions and
that defendant told her this was how he was trying to
solve his "mental state of mind" (45). Plaintiff also testified that defendant had never requested a divorce from
plaintiff ( 45). During the marriage plaintiff saw a marriage counselor, and defendant had been under psychiatric
care ( 46) . Plaintiff testified that defendant had extreme
sexual difficulties with plaintiff, and plaintiff felt the
therapy recommended by the psychiatrist was disrupting
their ma~riage .(4 7) .
A witness, Robert Carmody Pollei, called by plaintiff testified (71, 72) and defendant acknowledged ( 119)
that on one occasion defendant kissed and hugged a Jackie
Bigler. Mr. Pollei didn't know whether this occurred before or after May 10, 1962 ( 79) · This divorce action was
commenced May 10, 1962 ( 1 ) . Defendant testified that
said incident occurred the last part of May, after the commencement of this action (99), and that he did no dating
until after the commencement of this action (99, 135).
Mr. Pollei further testified that at about the same time,
defendant kept company with Jackie Bigler at an art
party ( 73) and that he wrestled with her ( 75) ~ Mr.
Pollei didn't know whether this art party was before or
after the complaint was filed ( 74) . Mr. Pollei also testi-
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fied that he saw defendant and said Jackie Bigler together
in the absence of plaintiff in a social event perhaps 10
times ( 76). Mr. Pollei did not testify as to the dates of
these occurrences. Defendant testified that he had told
his friends, in the presence of plaintiff, that the child they
were expecting was a mistake ( 114) . Defendant stated
that at the aforesaid art party his head had been on the
knee of said Jackie Bigler ( 118) . Defendant admitted that
he had been with said Jackie Bigler socially about three
times ( 118), but that he had only dated after the commencement of this action ( 135) .
Defendant testified that just prior to the marriage of
the parties they made plans that defendant should continue his schooling without holding a job ( 88) . This arrangement was also testified to by defendant's mother
( 13 7 ) , and plaintiff testified she planned to work while
defendant finished his education (58)· Defendant further testified that after marriage, to his surprise, plaintiff
insisted about one month after the marriage that defendant take a job ( 88). Defendant also testified that the
parties were never able to agree on the subject of defendant working in addition to going to school (90), and
that it resulted in numerous arguments (90). That as a
result of their arguments defendant built up resentment
( 90) , and defendant no longer desired the companionship of plaintiff (90) . Defendant testified there was too
much friction between the parties and that he could not
adjust to the friction and arguments, that defendant developed quite a serious case of ulcers due to the nervous
tension he was under (91). That the situation was a great
mental strain on defendant ( 91 ) , and that as a result de-
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fendant could no longer contribute his entire self to his
work and that a great deal of his problem was nervousness (91). Defendant's attorney asked defendant, "Any
other manifestations along those lines? Do you recall anything further?" Defendant answered "No." (91). Thereupon defendant's attorney asked defendant, "Did you
suffer sleeplessness?" Plaintiff objected to that question as
being leading and the court sustained the objection (92).
Defendant testified that he was under pressure in school
to put in more time ( 94), that plaintiff felt that he was
putting in too much time ( 94, 95), that discussion of the
subject resulted in argument and that defendant became very non-productive because of them (95), that
the parties were not in accord on social activities in connection with the Art Club of which defendant was Vice
Prresident ( 95) and that as a result plaintiff and defendant became more and more estranged (96). Defendant
testified that during the marriage from about February to
June of 1962 he consulted a psychiatrist because of mental stress and his relationship with his wife (97).
Plaintiff and defendant's mother testified that defendant had been fun-loving (57, 137), and plaintiff testified that towards the end of the marriage defendant was
not emotionally stable and in control of himself (59) .
Plaintiff testified that it was important to her in selecting
a husband to have one financially stable (58). Plaintiff
testified that she tried "very hard" to get defendant to
change some of his ways (63) and defendant's mother testified that plaintiff had told her she married defendant
because she thought she could change him ( 137).
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1· THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING PORTION OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING NUMBER 4, TO-WIT:
"ON OR ABOUT THE 29TH DAY OF APRIL, 1962,
AND PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT THERETO, DEFENDANT TREATED PLAINTIFF CRUELLY,
CAUSING HER GREAT MENTAL DISTRESS,"
AND THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF A DIVORCE ON HER
COMPLAINT.
Sec. 30-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides for
divorce for various causes. Among other things it permits,
in subsection ( 7) , a divorce for "Cruel treatment of the
plaintiff by the defendant to the extent of causing ...
great mental distress to the plaintiff." This is the ground
upon which plaintiff attempts to obtain a divorce in this
case. In order to obtain a divorce under said section, plaintiff must prove two things, to-wit: ( 1) cruel treatment
of plaintiff by defendant, and (2) that such cruel treatment caused great mental distress to plaintiff. This distinction appears to have been clearly recognized in the
case of Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 Utah 2d 153, 369 P.
2d 923 ( 1962).
It thus appears that the law imposes an objective
standard and a subjective standard. The determination
of what constitutes cruelty will be objectively determined;
the court will determine whether certain conduct is cruel
although this determination must always be made in the'
light of the particular facts. A given act may be cruel
in one set of circumstances and not at all cruel in another.
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Nonetheless, it is an objective determination. On the
other hand the law requires that the cruel act, be it ever
so cruel, must have a certain effect upon the plaintiffit must cause great mental distress. This is subjective in
its nature. The effect of given conduct will vary greatly
from person to person. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, supra.
It is undoubtedly true that cruel treament will not be
appreciated by anyone. This the law could safely assume,
and a court might be justified in implying or assuming
in every case where it found cruelty that the plaintiff did
not like it. But simply not liking certain cruel conduct does
not mean that it causes great mental distress, and the
court cannot assume that it does. Whether certain conduct has cause great mental distress is a question of fact
which must be proved.
In the present case the evidence does not disclose that
plaintiff suffered great mental distress as the result of
any cruelty on the part of defendant.
The only evidence of plaintiff's reaction to any conduct of defendant is found in her testimony in the following instances:
( 1 ) At page 34 of the record, plaintiff was asked,
"Now, Mrs· Melville, you have alleged that on or about
the 29th day of April, 1962, and prior and. subsequent
thereto, that the defendant has treated you cruelly, causing you great mental distress?" Plaintiff answered, "Yes."
Thus plaintiff has merely affirmed that she made certain
allegations. She did not testify that defendant's treatment
did in fact cause her great mental distress. Further, plaintiff's complaint is not verified by her oath, so we don't
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even have the allegation under oath. Plaintiff has merely
stated under oath that she made an allegation. This is
not evidence of great mental distress. Alleging is one
thing, proving another. Even if the complaint had been
verified, any statement therein contained would not be
evidence upon which the court could base a finding of
great mental distress. Sec. 30-3-4 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in part :
" . . · No decree of divorce shall be granted upon
default, or otherwise, except upon legal evidence
taken in the cause ... "
The holding of this court in the case of Treutle v.
District Court of Salt Lake County, 7 Utah 2d 155, 320
P. 2d 666 ( 1958) would seem to give support to the view
that an allegation in a complaint is not evidence.
( 2) At page 34 of the record plaintiff was asked,
"What are the circumstances that brought about this
charge?" This was followed by plaintiff's testimony with
regard to various matters. Here again, testimony concerning circumstances that brought about a charge is not
proof of great mental distress to plaintiff.
( 3) At page 36 of the record plaintiff testified that
the parties did not live in happiness and peace during the
first year of their marriage. That the parties were not
happy or at peace is not proof of great mental distress.
When a divorce can be granted because parties are not
happy or at peace then as a practical matter anyone can
get a divorce at about any time.
( 4) At pages 36 and 3 7 of the record plaintiff testified that it bothered her very much that defendant started
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smoking several months after marriage and that defendant commenced to drink alcoholic beverages· Being
"bothered very much" is certainly not the equivalent of
great mental distress. Even if it were, it is submitted that
smoking and drinking do not constitute cruelty in the first
place, especially in view of the fact that plaintiff had
done some smoking and drinking herself.
( 5) Finally, at page 42 of the record plaintiff testified that finding out that defendant had a reputation
for being flirtatious caused her very much mental concern, that it caused her anguish and that it caused her
embarrassment among her friends. It is conceded that
this is probably the equivalent of great mental distress,
but it is submitted that having a reputation of being flirtatious is not cruelty. Being flirtatious might be cruel, but
having a reputation isn't cruel. Having a reputation isn't
even an act, it doesn't constitute conduct on the part of
defendant. It is something over which defendant may
have no control. Had plaintiff proved that defendant was
flirtatious and had she then testified that this caused her
great mental distress, we would have a different situation. Further it is submitted that the court erred in allowing testimony as to reputation. This is discussed as Point
4 of the Argument herein. Even if testimony as to reputation is proper, it should only go to corroborate actual
testimony of the particular cruel act. It is the act which
must be cruel, not the reputation, and it is the act which
must cause great mental distress, not the reputation. In
this case there is no testimony that plaintiff suffered great
mental distress because defendant was flirtatious·
It is submitted that plaintiff did not prove that any
conduct of defendant caused her great mental distress.
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POINT 2. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT: "DEFENDANT SHOULD
BE DENIED ANY RECOURSE BY VIRTUE OF HIS
COUNTERCLAIM." AND THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT A
DIVORCE UPON HIS COUNTERCLAIM AND IN
HAVING DISMISSED SAID COUNTERCLAIM.
SUCH ACTION IS PLAINLY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. AND IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST AND
INEQUITABLE.
As discussed in Point 1 of this argument, plaintiff
failed to establish grounds for divorce. It is submitted that
defendant clearly established grounds. The substance of
defendant's testimony was that plaintiff's failure almost
immediately after their marriage and long before the
child entered the picture, to abide by the original agreement of the parties that plaintiff would work while defendant went to school, resulted in arguments between
the parties.
This certainly constitutes cruelty, especially when
viewed in light of plaintiff's admission as to the importance of finances to her. There is ample testimony that
this caused defendant great mental distress.
There can be little doubt that this marriage should
be dissolved. Defendant's physical and mental health are
at stake. It appears that the parties are unsuited for each
other. Finances are important to plaintiff. She has a good
job in a stable profession· She belonged to a sorority in
college and during the marriage belonged to a bridge club.
The secure life seems to be very important to plaintiff.
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On the other hand defendant is an artist, and every indication is that financial matters do not have the same importance for him.
This court has held in effect that when it is evident
that no good purpose can be served by compelling the
parties to remain together a divorce should be granted,
assuming of course that proper grounds have been established. See Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d
977 (1956).
This is such a case. Defendant has established
grounds and plaintiff has not; the divorce should have
been awarded to defendant on his counterclaim.
POINT 3. THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT; THAT A REASONABLE AMOUNT
TO BE AWARDED PLAINTIFF AS ALIMONY IS
$50 PER MONTH, THAT IT IS REASONABLE
THAT THE MERCEDES AUTOMOBILE, THE
FURNITURE AND HOUSEHOLD FURNISHINGS
(EXCEPT ONE RECORD CABINET, ONE 36-PIECE
CRYSTAL SET, AND DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL
WEARING APPAREL) ,BE AWARDED TO PLAIN::,
TIFF, THAT IT IS REASONABLE THAT PLAINTIFF BE AWARDED $400 ATTORNEY FEES. THAT
THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING FINDINGS,
AND SUCH JUDGMENT IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE.
In order to determine whether a divorce decree is
inequitable, it must be viewed in its entirety, and thus
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although viewed alone some parts of the decree are proper, appeal is taken from the entire decree. This view
seems to be supported by the case of Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P· 2d 931 (1958) where the
court held in effect that an atatck on a divorce decree is
regarded as an attack upon the whole decree.
Defendant concedes that it was proper to grant custody of the child of the parties to plaintiff, subject to reasonable rights of visitation in defendant and to award
plaintiff $50 per month child support money and a judgment for arrears under order pendente lite for $597.75,
and to order defendant to pay said bills in the sum of
$79.49. Defendant submits however that this must be
taken into consideration in determining whether the rest
of the decree is inequitable as claimed by defendant.
In the case of Wilson v. Wilson, supra, this court
set forth the matters, to be considered in adjusting the
"economic resources" of the parties; it was there said at
page 82:
"When it appeared that the purposes of matrimony had been destroyed to the extent that further living together was intolerable, it was in accordance with the court's duty and perogative to
grant plaintiff a divorce. In doing so it is desirable to avoid perpetuation of the difficulties that
brought failure to the marriage. The object to be
desired is to minimize animosities and to 'let the
dead past bury its dead' insofar as that is possible.
The court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide
a just and equitable adiustment of their economic
resources so that the parties can reconstruct their
lives on a happy and useful basis. In doing so it is
necessary for the court to consider, in addition to
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the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an
appraisal of all of the attendant facts and circumstances: the duration of the marriage; the ages of
the parties; their social positions and standards of
living; their health; considerations relative to children; the money and property they possess and
how it was acquired; their capabilities and training and their present and potential incomes."
Viewing this case in the light of the foregoing quotation:
RELATIVE GUILT. It appears that in all justice
relative guilt or innocence should play a minor role in this
case. Only defendant has proved grounds for divorce, but
as in most cases there are things to be said in favor of each
party as well as against each party. Although the parties
are both young in this case and the marriage a short one,
ill health (including mental health) appears to have
played a very large part in the difficulties between these
parties and the following statement in the case of Martinett v· Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P. 2d 821 (1958),
at page 204 should also apply here:
"In a case such as this, where the parties have
spent substantially their adult lives together, and
the trouble between them has seemed to come
largely from inability to make adjustments to ill
health and advancing years, the matter of considering relative guilt or innocence in bringing
about the divorce was properly considered by the
trial court as minimal insofar as bearing on their
property rights."
DURATION OF MARRIAGE AND AGE OF
PARTIES. Plaintiff was 26 years old at the trial. The
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parties had been married less than a year and nine
months at the time ·they· separated. This is not a case
where plaintiff has given away the best years of her life.
What has plaintiff lost by the marriage? She increased
her professional skills and she has a child - both are
gains to plaintiff. She has had an unfortunate experience, perhaps. In the case of Foreman v. Foreman, 111
Utah 72, 176 P. 2d 144 ( 1946) at page 88 this court
clearly said "heart balm" is not an issue in a divorce
case:
"It would seem from a reading of the above
statements that what the court was attempting to
do here was compensate Mrs. Foreman for her
suffering of the pangs of unrequited love- heart
balm- and teach Mr. Foreman a lesson in marriage. Neither task is properly within the issues of
a divorce case such as this."
It is grossly inequitable to award permanent alimony in this case where the parties were married for such
a short time, and plaintiff's condition has not materially
changed. Plaintiff is 26 years old.' If defendant pays
her $50 per month alimony until she is even 70 years old,
he will have been required to pay her about $26,000,
and this after less than 2 years of marriage while living
together. It is true the plaintiff may remarry, but she
may not.
SOCIAL POSITION AND STANDARD OF LIVING. Plaintiff was a college graduate before the marriage, and during the marriage she increased her skills
and became a librarian. Plaintiff's beginning salary as
a teacher was $3600 per year; it is now $4200 or more
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per year~ The general, tenor of .her testimony was that
defendant was not much help financially during the marriage. It clearly appears that her standard of living won't
be hurt by this divorce. In fact she will not have to help
defendant with his schooling.
HEALTH. It clearly appears that defendant does
not have good physical health. He testified that he had
ulcers and other physical problems. In addition, he has
emotional problems severe enough toward the end of the
marriage to . require psychiatric treatment. The court
should be especially careful not to impose undue hardship
upon defendant in such a case.
CHILDREN· The parties have one child. It is proper that plaintiff have custody, and that defendant pay
plaintiff $50 per month for the support of the child. This
of course means an extra financial responsibility upon
defendant which must be considered.
POSSESSIONS AND HOW ACQUIRED. The
parties had property worth about $3131. Much of the
property was received as gifts. The court a warded property worth $86 to defendant. The circumstances of this
case cannot justify such a one-sided award. Defendant
asked for property worth $941 (of which the largest item
was a bedroom set worth $600, which was gift from defendant's parents) plus a one-half interest in the $600
automobile. Thus plaintiff asked for property worth about
$1241 -far less than one-half of the property of the parties. Of course the Mercedes would have to be sold, but
it would permit each to get a start in purchasing another
car, and defendant testified that he needed a car.
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TRAINING AND INCOME. The testimony discloses that plaintiff has a good job in a stable profession
- a school librarian - and that defendant hasn't even
completed his schooling. Plaintiff's net pay is $288 per
month. Defendant testified that his net pay was $250
per month·
The expenses of plaintiff and the child total $340 per
month - which includes $30 for miscellaneous items including entertainment. Defendant's expenses are $202.10
per month. After defendant pays plaintiff $50 per month
child support plaintiff would have $338 per month which
is essentially what she testified she needed including entertainment. On the other hand defendant would have
only $200 left which is less than, but essentially, what he
testified his expenses were without entertainment. If in
addition, plaintiff received $50 per month alimony, plaintiff will have an unwarranted windfall of $50, and defendant will have $50 less than he needs. The circumstances of this case do not justify alimony.
In making such an award the trial court was perhaps influenced by the testimony regarding defendant's
dating after the divorce action was commenced. This
court in the case of Vrontikis v. Vrontikis, 11 Utah 2d
305, 358 P. 2d 632 (1961), held at page 306:
"Evidence as to conduct subsequent to the
filing of a divorce complaint is inadmissable
for the purpose of establishing grounds for
divorce, but it admissable as lending weight to
and corroborating testimony as to prior acts of ill
treatment."
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Thus such testimony can only assist the court in determining whether it will believe testimony of prior acts
- i t does not change the nature of any such prior act.
The court may also have been influenced by the defendant's statement that the child was a mistake. This
undoubtedly meant unexpected· In any case, it is not
a ground for divorce, because it was brought out after
plaintiff had finished testifying, and there is no evidence
at all that it caused plaintiff great mental distress. The
child may well have been unexpected by plaintiff also.
The only explanation for such an award of alimony in
this case is that it is punitive. This court however in the
case of Wilson v. Wilson, supra, stated at page 82 that
it is improper to administer "punitive measures in a divorce judgment."
In cases where the evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings of the trial court, or where there has
been plain abuse of discretion, or where a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought this court can and should
change the judgment of the trial court. See Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P. 2d 939 ( 1958). This is clearly
such a case. In view of the foregoing, plaintiff should not
be awarded any alimony; defendant should be awarded
the property sought by him or its equivalent in value; and
finally, defendant should not be required to pay $400
attorney fees in view of the fact that the evidence shows
that plaintiff earns more than defendant and because the
divorce should be awarded to defendant.
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POINT 4~ THE TRIAL COURT· ERRED IN
OVERRPLING DEFENDAN·T:'S OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE ..
At the trial (Record page, 41 ) plaintiff was allowed
to introduce testimony as to defendant's reputation for
being flirtatious over defendant's objection that such testimony was immaterial and improper. Such testimony
is of course hearsay and thus incompetent and improper.
Further, it is immaterial and irrelevant what defendant's
reputation is. The issue in this case is what defendant did
or did_ not do -not ~hat his ~eputation is. In 17 .Am.
Jur. Divorce, Sec. 408, _it is said in connection with divorce on grounds of ad~ltery:
. ·
" ... it is well recognized that the character of the
wife for chastity is not in issue so as to render admissible against her, in the first instance, evidence
of her reputation for unchastity.'~
Although we are not here dealing with adultery
grounds, the same rule should apply. In addition, thereputation testified to was not even a general one, but rather
appears to deal with defendant's reputation among plaintiff's friends. The admission of such testimony of reputation constitutes prejudicial error.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, thej udgment of the trial
court should be reversed, and defendant should be award-
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ed a divorce on his counterclaim and the other relief
sought by defendant on this appeal as hereinbefore set
out.
Respectfully submitted,
William G. Shelton and
Robert C· Cummings
705 Utah Savings Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

